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ANTITRUST-ASCAP PRICING METHOD HELD NOT To VIOLATE
SHERMAN Ac-r-K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp., 372 F.2d
1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 36 L.W. 3280 (1968) -In an action by the
Gershwin Publishing Corporation, a member of the American So-
ciety of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), for the in-
fringement of various musical compositions on which Gershwin held
copyrights, the appellant radio station operator admitted the ex-
propriation and infringement of appellee's copyrights. The appel-
lant, however, claimed that the appellees, between themselves and
in conjunction with ASCAP, were misusing their copyrights in vio-
lations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act' and in violation or
the antitrust laws of the State of Washington.2 The appellant argued
this should preclude relief, relying on a theory of unclean hands.8
The appellant also counter-claimed for treble damages and an in-
junction against further misuse of the copyright.4 The trial court de-
nied relief and K-91 appealed the civil nonjury decision. The
Ninth Circuit rejected the appellant's claim on appeal affirming
the judgment of the district court and in so doing rejected the
counterclaim, finding that Gershwin had not conspired with ASCAP
to violate the antitrust laws.
The Copyright Act of 1909 afforded the holders of copyrights
the right to control the performance of their works in public for
profit.5 The purpose of enacting such legislation is clearly ex-
pressed in the constitutional grant to Congress of the power to
grant such limited monopolies to authors and inventors.0 In order
to "promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts", writers,
composers and publishers are granted the means under the Copy-
right Act and the Constitution to control the use of their works.
S15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
2 REv. CODE WASH. § 19.24.020 (1961).
' The courts have refused to permit the assertion of the defense of unclean hands
to bar copyright infringement actions although it is permitted in patent infringement
suits. See Harm's Inc. v. Sansom House Enterprises, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Penn.
1958); M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 F. 470 (B.D. S.Car. 1924),
afj'd., 2 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1924); Harms v. Cohen, 279 F. 276 (E.D. Penn. 1922).
But see M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948). See also
Fine, Misuse and Antitrust Defenses in Copyright Infringement Actions, 17 HASTINGS
L REv. 315 (1965); NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 149 (1967).
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1964).
- 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
6 See NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 3.1 (1967).
' U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
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Due to the myriad of possible users of music, the market surveil-
ance as well as enforcement were beyond the capability of any in-
dividual copyright holder. This situation gave birth to ASCAP,
which is an association of over eight thousand members.$ Those
users who wish to perform a copyrighted piece of music in ASCAP's
repertory secure a license from ASCAP. The licensing fees ob-
tained for copyrighted music are periodically divided among the
members who have assigned to ASCAP the right to license their
works on a nonexclusive basis.9 Undoubtedly, by providing the
musicians of our society with their rewards, this organization has
been a prime instrumentality in carrying out the goals of the fram-
ers of our Constitution. But at the same time we are reminded
that:
Once organized on a broad commercial scale for profit, even
the aesthetic pursuit of dreams, music and other evidences of
free spirit may engender commercial repressions inconsistent
with our basic antitrust philosophy of free trade and fair compe-
tition.'0
In order to prevent this result the Justice Department has brought
antitrust actions against ASCAP on repeated occasions. These
suits have resulted in consent decrees being negotiated in 1941,"1
1950,12 and 1960.1 These decrees are broadly directed toward
requiring that (1) the rights acquired by ASCAP from its mem-
bers be nonexclusive,' 4 (2) that the licenses be granted without
discrimination,' 5 (3) that the license fee be reasonable with pro-
visions for court review if a dispute arises as to the reasonableness
of the rate fixed 16 and (4) that there be a certain ease of entrance
' For a discussion of ASCAP's development see Comment, ASCAP and the Anti.
trust Laws: The Story of a Reasonable Compromise, 1959 DUKE LJ. 258. See also
Finklestein, Public Performance Rights In Music and Performing Rights Societies, 7
COPYRIGHT PROBs. ANALYZED 69 (1952).
' For a recent discussion of the operation of ASCAP and other organizations in the
musical field see S. SHEMEL & W. KRAsILOvsKY, THIs BusINESS or MUsic 89 (1964)
and its supplement, S. SHEMEL & W. KRASrLOVSKY, MORE ABOUT THIS BusrNEss op
Music 10 (1967).
" Timberg, Antitrust Aspects of fodern Merebandising: The ASCAP Cosent
ludgment of 1950. 19 LAw & CONTEmp. PROB. 294 (1954).
" United States v- ASCAP, 1940-43 Trade Cas. 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
" United States v. ASCAP, 1950-1951 Trade Cas. 65,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
" United States v. ASCAP, 1960 Trade Cas. 69,612 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
" 1950-51 Trade Cas. 62,595, at 63,752 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
Id. at 63,754.
's Id.
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and withdrawal from the Society." ASGAP's activities are there.
fore largely influenced by consent decrees. Within this context,
the appellant in Gershwin claimed ASCAP was violating the anti-
trust laws.
The Ninth Circuit answered the claims of K-91 with little
citation of authority. This is unfortunatefor the validity of ASCAP's
operations under the antitrust laws and consent decrees is a question
which the courts have not often considered.13 The appellant as-
serted that ASCAP had attained such power that it could fix prices
and that it was a combination in restraint of trade in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act. 0 An allegation of monopolization
was also included. The appellant added that although there may
be a procedure for court review to determine a reasonable fee, the
reasonableness of the fee is irrelevant if it is a fixed fee.20 The
court of appeals, however, clearly felt the consent decrees were a
redeeming factor on the charge of price-fixing. It stated that "we
think that as a potential combination in restraint of trade, ASCAP
has been disinfected by the consent decree." 2' 1 Furthermore, the
court determined that "[a]s long as ASCAP complies with the de-
cree, it is not the price-fixing authority.122
But is the court's reliance on this procedure for review justi-
fied? Rather than preventing price-fixing or eliminating it, the
consent decrees in reality seek only to eliminate the evils arising
from price-fixing. Nowhere do the consent decrees state that com-
pliance with their terms shall prevent ASCAP and its members
from being a price-fixing authority.2 Discrimination is prohibited
and reasonableness is supposedly assured by the availability of
1960 Trade Cas. 69,612, at 76,468 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
" In 1918 a New York court ruled that ASCAP did not create a common law re-
straint of trade in so far as a prospective user remained free to use any music for which
ASCAP was not the licensor. 174th St. & St. Nicholas Ave. Amusement Co. v. Maxwell,
169 N.Y.S. 895 (Sup. Ct 1918).
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
= See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927).
K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp. 372 F.2d 1, 4 (0th Cir. 1967).
'Id.
' While the court felt that the consent decrees did disinfect ASCAP, it resolved that
it did not have to consider the more perplexing question of whether the consent decree
could also immunize against further prosecution. Presumably, to disinfect would Involve
a removal or prohibition of the objectionable activities, while to immunize would reflect
the notion that regardless of the objectionability of the activities, they are protected by
the decree from attack. Id.
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court review.2 4 The consent decrees recognize the necessity for
such an association as ASCAP in the musical field and attempt to
control its activities without destroying its usefulness. There has
been a compromise between the goals of the copyright laws and
those of the antitrust laws.25
An inquiry into the provisions of the consent decrees which
relate to the procedure of court review reveals that the courts
have created a situation which the Supreme Court was seeking
to avoid under the doctrine that price fixing is illegal per se.26
Agreements which create such potential power may well be held
to be in themselves unreasonable or unlawful restraints, with-
out the necessity of minute inquiry whether a particular price
is reasonable or unreasonable as fixed and without placing on
the government... the burden of ascertaining from day to day
whether [the rate] has become unreasonable .... 27
Indeed, it is even questionable whether any district court should
be given such review powers for this involves a de novo determina-
tion of the facts and thus is quite similar to requiring an Article
III court to perform Article I functions.
Furthermore, if the propriety and consistency of such a plan
is placed to one side and assuming that the plan is the result of a
reasonable compromise, there remains the fact that such a procedure
is one of dubious value to the prospective licensee who is faced
with a fee which he feels is unreasonable. In order to avail him-
self of the opportunity afforded by the decree, an application must
be filed in the District Court for the Southern District of New
York. The applicant must go to New York for the hearings to be
held by the court; this can be a great inconvenience. This incon-
venience is ironic when, it is considered that the purpose of this
procedure was to eliminate the necessity of acquiescing in ASCAP's
rate. The costs involved in an attempt to invoke the procedure
will often be greater than the amount of the fee in question. The
See United States v. ASCAP, 1950-1951 Trade Cas. 62,595, 63,754 (S.D.N.Y.
1950). Briefly, this section provides that if the applicant for a license and ASCAP are
unable to agree within sixty days from the date of application, the applicant can file with
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for a determina.
don of a reasonable fee. Pending the completion of the proceeding, use is given of the
ASCAP repertory for an interim fee.
' See Comment, ASCAP and The Antitrust Laws: The Story of A Reasonable Comp.
romise, 1959 DuK L. J. 258.
' See United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 296 (1945);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
'r United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927).
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idea behind the creation of this opportunity for court review has
merit as a part of the compromise alluded to above, but its admin-
istration makes the procedure illusory as a useful alternative.
Transfer seems to be foreclosed as a means of overcoming the pro-
hibitive cost of a price challenge since the review is not an action
but only a step in an action invoking the jurisdiction which the
District Court for the Southern District of New York has retained.28
Nor is it likely that another court would set up its own review
procedure, for if the Gershwin case is followed by other courts, a
complainent would lose in an antitrust action. The availability
of this procedure of court review is, therefore, of questionable
value and courts should give this area further consideration be-
fore the procedure is relied on to disinfect otherwise questionable
activities.2 9
In addition to the price review procedure, the consent decrees
provide that ASCAP is forbidden from operating as an exclusive
licensing authority. This is an additional fact which the court in
Gershwin relied upon in determining that the activities described
by the appellant do not violate the antitrust laws.80 The court
assumes the rights of the individual member of ASCAP to make
his own arrangements with prospective users and the rights of
such users to seek individual arrangements are fully preserved by
the consent decrees. The 1941 Consent Decree contained provisions
designed to prohibit ASCAP from acquiring or asserting other than
a nonexclusive right to the works of its members, but several limiting
clauses almost completely nullified this general prohibition. 1 One of
- 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1964).
' It was suggested even before the first consent decree that the United States might
consider adopting the system used by the Canadians. See 51 HAtv. L. REV. 906, 914
(1938). Under this system the licensing organizations file a schedule of rates with the
government copyright office once each year. This is then published in the Candda 6VIz0iiu
and there are 21 days allowed for the filing of objections to these proposed rates. I-lFr-
ings are then held by the Copyright Appeal Board, and the rates determined remain In
force for the next year. This procedure places the burden of assuring reasonable rates
in the hands of an agency designed to perform the function rather than an already over-
burdened court. CAN. REV. STAT., ch. 55, §§ 48-51 (1952).
.' K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp., 372 F. 2d 1, 4 (9th Cir.), erl,
denied, 36 L.W. 3280 (1968).
*' United States v. ASCAP, 1940-1943 Trade Cas. 56,104 at 56,403 (S.DN.Y.
1940). This interpretation was suggested by Sigmund Timberg who was Chief, Judgment
and Enforcement Section, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice at the time of the
issuance of the 1950 Amended Final Judgment. See Timberg, The Antitrust Aspects of
Merchandising Modern Music: The ASCAP Consent Judgment of 1950, 19 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 294, 320 (1954).
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these limiting conditions related to ASCAP's right to prohibit
members from granting or assigning persons, firms, corporations
or enterprises, including Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) (ASCAP's
only significant competitor providing similar services), the right
to license copyrighted compositions which were in ASCAP's reper-
tory. The 1941 decree came under attack from the Justice Depart-
ment as a result of complaints from both members and users of
ASCAP. In the wake of two district court decisions in 1948 which
had criticized ASCAP as being in violation of the antitrust laws,3 2
the Justice Department sought a revamping of the 1941 decree
resulting in the 1950 Amended Final Judgment. Unlike the prev-
ious decree, it contained no limiting provision regarding the
rights of the organization's members to issue performing licenses.88
ASCAP, however, does not permit its members to license the same
songs with BMI that the member licensed with it.34 If a member
contracts with BMI, that member loses all credits and royalties
from ASCAP for the song involved.3 5 While the question of licens-
ing with both ASCAP and BMI may be touched on in the 1960
decree, the problem still remains, and this raises questions as to
the validity of any assertion that the individual copyright owner's
rights are fully preserved. ASCAP was organized in response to
the ineffectiveness and worthlessness of the individual licensing
arrangement. Yet it is the value of the individual right to license
which this court relies on to help disinfect ASCAP. The only op-
portunity for real value would be the possibility of licensing with
BMI, but ASCAP makes the cost of doing so prohibitive. What-
ever ASCAP's justification for a complete termination of payment
for the song involved, the fact remains that ASCAP and similar
organizations exist in the music industry to provide their mem-
bers with the most effective means of reaching the widest possible
market. Some users may obtain both ASCAP and BMI licenses.
But to the extent that they do not, the ASCAP member is de-
prived of the widest possible market for his works. A reduction in
the royalty payment on a song licensed with both ASCAP and
BMI might be justified as being based on the theory that the song
' See Alden-Rochelle, Inc., v. ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); 2.
Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp 843 (D. Mnn. 1948).
' United States v. ASCAP, 1950-1951 Trade Cas. 62,595 at 63,752 (S.D.N.Y.
1950). ASCAP was enjoined from "limiting, restricting or interfering with the rights of
any member to issue to a user non-exclusive licenses for rights of public performance."
*' See S. SHEmEL & W. KRAsLovsKy, THIS BusnSS or Music, 93-94 (1964).
"Id. at 94.
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is not worth as much to ASCAP when licensed with BMI. But to
say that it is worth nothing and therefore exclude royalty pay-
ments is to step beyond the reasonable into the area of unreason-
able restraint of trade. This restraint on the right to license an.
other clearing house and the impracticality of individual licensing
together render illusory whatever guarantees of nonexclusiveness
were intended by the consent decrees. Therefore, in light of the
illusory nonexclusive provisions and the prohibitive inconvenience
of the price adjustment mechanism, the Gershwin court's reliance
on the consent decrees as safeguards against antitrust evils seems
misplaced.
Aside from the validity of the appellee's activities in combina-
tion with ASCAP under federal statutes, the appellant in Gershwin
asserted in his defense that the appellees had violated antitrust
laws of Washington relating to copyrights. 80 These statutes make
unlawful certain combinations of copyright owners which are
formed for the purpose of fixing prices on the use of copyrighted
music, or for the purpose of collecting fees in Washington, or to
issue blanket licenses in Washington for the use of copyrighted
music. Such combinations are permitted by the statutes if they
issue licenses on a per piece system of usage. This statute was en-
acted in March, 1937, and similar statutes were enacted in other
states arising from a wave of "Anti-ASCAP" feeling among local
broadcasters.37 Within two months after Washington enacted the
statute in question, Tennessee adopted an identical statute.88
ASCAP vigorously challenged these attempts at state regulation
or prohibition of their activities. In 1940 the Tennessee act was
declared void and unconstitutional as being class legislation which
deprived copyright owners of the rights granted to them under the
federal statutes by restricting the right of contract and taking
property without due process of law.89 With this decision behind
it, ASCAP then turned its attention toward obtaining a review of
the Washington statute but was unsuccessful in obtaining a decision
" REV. CODE WAsH. 19.24.020 (1961).
' For a discussion of the various forms of the state statutes enacted in this area and
a system of classification for them see, Comment, Public Performance For Profit Through
The Medium of Copyrighted Musical Compositions, 35 MiSs. L. J. 295, 304-05 (1964);
DeMarines, State Regulation of Musical Copyright, 6 COPYRIGHT LAW SYMP. 118, 126
(1955); Finkelstein, The Composer and the Public Interest--Regulation of Performing
Right Societies, 19 LAw & CONrmP. PRoBs. 275, 289 (1954).
sLaw of May 21, 1937, ch. 212 TMNN. PUBLIc Acrs of 1937 (repealed 1943).
Buck v. Harton, 33 F. Supp. 1014 (M.D. Tenn. 1940).
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as to its validity.40 The constitutionality of the Washington statute
and others similar to it is doubtful. Indeed the questionable valid-
ity of the "Anti-ASCAP" legislation is referred to in the trial
court's memorandum opinion when it says
that to construe the provisions of the Washington statute ...
so as to make the acts of the plaintiffs, or ASCAP in this case,
unlawful would raise grave questions concerning the constitu-
tionality of the Washington statute under the Fourteenth
Amendment.41
A strict enforcement of the statute would undoubtedly deprive
copyright owners of the ability to profit from the monopoly given
them by the Copyright Act. The court of appeals did not mention
the questionable validity of the statute, however, for it found that
the Attorney General of Washington had determined that ASCAP
was in reasonable compliance with the statute. Attack of this legis-
lation has been left to future litigation, but in light of the court's
reading of the statute there will be little need to attack it since
the standards for finding compliance are quite flexible.
ANTITRUST-PossBLE INJURY TO COMPETITION UNDER RoBINSON-
PATMAN AcT--Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S.
685 (1967), rehearing denied, 387 U.S. 949 (1967) -The plaintiff
asked treble damages and injunctive relief, alleging injury to com-
petition in frozen fruit pies in the Utah market area by Continental
Baking Company, Pet Milk Company, and Carnation Company.
Plaintiff sought recovery for a conspiracy under sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act' and for price discrimination under section 2 (a)
" Buck v. Gallagher, 36 F. Supp. 405 (W.D. Wash. 1940) (dismissed on doctrine
of plaintiff's undean hands).
' Petitioner's Brief for Certorari at A-8, K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp.,
(filed May 9, 1967).
1 15 U.S.C §§ 1, 2 (1964).
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of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act.2 The
jury found for defendants on the Sherman Act count and for
plaintiff on the Robinson-Patman -count, with actual damages total-
ing nearly 100,000 dollars,3 and the trial court entered judgment for
three times the verdict and issued the injunction.4 The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ordered judgment n.o.v.B
In a- detailed opinion it held that the evidence of price discrimina-
tion and possible injury to competition was insufficient to make out
a prima facie case. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to
the court of appeals for consideration of further questions, holding
that the evidence on these issues justified the jury verdict.Although the Court approaches the case as one presenting an
evidentiary problem, and its reluctance to tamper with jury verdicts
is apparent, 6 the case is significant as a matter of substantive anti-
trust law because of the final inference of possible injury to com-
petition that the jury is permitted to draw fxom the intermediate
factual inferences justified by the evidence.
Plaintiff is a small company with a single plant in Salt Lake
City. It manufactures frozen dessert pies marketed primarily in
Utah and a few neighboring States. During the four year period
in question, it had 66.5 percent, 34.3 percent, 45.5 percent and
45.3 percent of the relevant market. By comparison, defendants are
all relatively large companies, having broad territorial and product-
15 U.S.C. § 13 (a) (1964), the relevant portion of which is:
Jt shall be unlawful for any person... either directly or indirectly, to discrim.
inate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and
quality... where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure,
destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowing-
ly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of
them ....
The statute indudes several provisos, the two most important being cost justification
("nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance
for differences in cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)), and
good faith meeting of competition ("nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller
rebutting the prima fade case thus made by showing that his lower price... was made
in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor . .." 15 U.S.C. § 13 (b)).
Brief for Petitioner at 57-58, Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S.
685 (1967).
" Continental Baking Co. v. Utah Pie Co., 349 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1965), ruv'd,
Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
5Id.
1 316 Bureau of Natel. Affairs, Inc., Antitrust and Trade Regulation Report (Aug.
1, 1967), at B-3.
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line diversification; but their shares of this market ranged from a
high of 35.5 percent for Pet in 1959 to as low as 1.3 percent for
Continental in 1958. In 1961, the final year in question, Pet had
29.4 percent, Carnation 8.8 percent and Continental 8.3 percent.
Defendants' nearest plants are located in California. Frozen pie
sales of all parties had risen steadily in a rapidly expanding market.
The Court found evidence from which the jury could have
inferred both predatory intent7 and below-cost pricing.8 Justice
White's opinion indicates that these elements provided a basis for a
finding of a reasonably possible injury to competition, in spite of
the apparent good health of the plaintiff. In dissent, Justice Stewart,
with whom Justice Harlan joined, accused the majority of protecting
a competitor rather than competition, and thus of actually inhibiting
competition by protecting a virtual monopoly.
The case raises the issue of the consistency of the Robinson-
Pat-man Act's prohibitions on certain price discriminations with the
overall antitrust policies of preservation of viable competition as a
means of resisting price enhancement and fostering a workable and
equitable economic structure. Geographical price cutting designed
to bring smaller competitors to their knees was widely decried
early in the century as one of the most predatory practices of the
great trusts9 and has been illegal under section 2 of the Clayton Act
since 1914.10 In 1936, the language of section 2 was strengthened
by the amending Robinson-Patman Act," which was aimed pri-
marily at protection of the small independent retailer. This amend-
ment sought to attack the type of discrimination that has come
to be known as "secondary-line," that is, when competition between
Pet had sent an industrial spy into Utah's plant, and remarks about Utah by all
three defendants showed that no love was lost between the parties. Utah Pie Co. v. Con-
tinental Baking Co., 386 US. 685, 696-97 (1967). See note 32 infra.
' There was direct, although disputed, evidence of below-cost pricing for a period of
several weeks by Continental, and such pricing was permissible inference with regard
to the other defendants. That there was a rapidly deteriorating price structure in the
market was dear;, the average price of a dozen apple pies fell from $4.72 in 1958 to
$3.14 in 1961, a drop of more than 33%. Cost savings of this magnitude appear doubt-
fuL Continental Baking Co. v. Utah Pie Co., 349 F.2d 122, 159-62 (10th Cir. 1965).
' See United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1906); Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
10 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964),formerly ch. 323, § 2, 38 STAT. 730 (1964).
'" Ch. 592, § 1, 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), amending 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964). The
principal defect of § 2 (a) of the Clayton Act was the total exemption of discrimination
based on quantity discounts. Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F. 2d 47, 53 (1st Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965); F. ROWE, PRIcE DIScRIuMINATON UNDER THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr 6-11 (1962).
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buyers from the discriminating seller may be injured.12 However, in
the primary-line area, where the threatened competition is that
between the discriminating seller and other sellers, the Act simply
strengthens the price discrimination provisions of the Clayton Act. 18
Since FTC v. Anhauser-Busch, Inc., 4 it has been clear that dis.
crimination as used in the Robinson-Patman Act means nothing
more than price difference, 5 and the Utah Pie case makes clear that
a differential between any two areas is a discrimination; the price
in issue need not be lower than that charged everywhere else by
the defendant. But discrimination is not a violation per se,10 and
implicit in Utah Pie is that a showing of discrimination, without
more, does not present a prima facie case.17 The plaintiff must
prove the second element of his case, that
12 The courts in secondary-line cases have had understandable difficulty in rcconeil.
ing the Act with the policy of fostering vigorous competition, since it may prevent ft
supplier from coming to the rescue of his dealer in a highly-competitive situation, and
may lead to price rigidity, if enforced without full consideration of the economic stun.
tion. See Elman, The Robinson-Patman Act and Antitrust Policy: A Time for Reapprahal,
42 WASH. L REv. 1 (1966).
C. EDWARDS, THE iPRICE DISCRIMINATING LAW 636 (1959).
14 363 U.S. 536 (1960).
i' Difference, however, should not be understood to include economic discrimina.
tion-that is, delivered pricing without regard to transportation costs. It appears that
the courts will not find discrimination so long as either Lo.b. prices or delivered prices
are the same, even though the latter does involve a difference in the amount realized by
the seller. Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 737 (1945). The legality
of "zone" or "basing point" pricing will depend whether it is simply a compromise be.
tween f.o.b. and delivered pricing or is for some ulterior purpose. Ste generally A.
SAWYER, BusINFss ASPECTS OF PRICING UNDER THi ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 197-303
(1963), and cases cited at 226. For an example of discriminatory use of zone pricing,
see STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON ANITRUST & MONOPOLY, 85T1-1 CONGRESS,
2ND SESs., ADMINISTERED PRICES - ASPHALT ROOFING (Comm. Print 1958).
" American Oil Co. v. FTC, 325 F.2d 101, 104 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 954 (1964).
" This position has been accepted explicitly in several circuits. Anhauser-Buseh, Inc.
v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835, 840 (7th Cir., 1961); Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms
Co., 231 F.2d 356, 368 (9th Cir., 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991, rehearing denied,
351 U.S. 928 (1956); A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 135 F.2d 453, 455 (7th Cir.
1943); Cf. Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 118 (1954). Cont.a,
Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734
(1945). The Second Circuit has stuck to its guns in this matter, refusing to distinguish
between primary line and secondary line cases. Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319,
326 (2d Cir. 1957). Ruberoid Co. v. FTC, 189 F.2d 893, 895 (2d Cir. 1949),
aff'd., FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1951). However ,in affirming the Ruberoid
decision, the Supreme Court seemed to recognize the distinction, citing injury to Ruberoid's
customers. 343 U.S. at 473-74.
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the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly ... or to injure,
destroy, or prevent competition with any person who . . .
grants... the benefit of such discrimination.' 8
Thus the discrimination, not simply the lower price, must cause
the injury or be the potential cause of possible injury.' The test
of injury is an incipiency test; the plaintiff or the ].TC need not
show actual injury, but only a "reasonable possibility" of injury
to competition.20
No difficulty is encountered in finding possible injury to com-
petition when the discriminator is part of a conspiracy,2' or where
elimination of the local competitor will result in a monopoly.22
Nor is there a problem when a predatory purpose to destroy a com-
petitor by what the courts call "buccanneering" by a powerful com-
pany appears.28 Nor should there be any difficulty in exonerating a
defendant who possesses limited market power and resources in a
highly competitive market, one in which there are a large number
of sellers with no one dominating, and who has shown no intent to
bring his competitors to their knees.2 4 In such a situation, price
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
"It is essential.., that there be a casual relation between the price discrimina.
tion ... and ... an actual or reasonably probable lessening of ability to compete... :*
Castle, J., in American Oil Co. v. FTC, 325 F.2d 101, 104 (7th Cr. 1963), ccrt. denied,
377 U.S. 954 (1964). Accord, Shore Gas & Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.,
224 F. Supp. 922 (D.N.J., 1963) (good analysis by Lane, J.). Cf. International Milling
Co., [1963-65 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,494, 16,648 (F.T.C. 1963).
' Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC 324 U.S. 726, 738 (1945); Forster Mfg. Co.
v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47, 50-1 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965). Justice
Whites use of the phrase "reasonable possibility" in Utah Pie should settle the lirgely
academic controversy over possibility and probability. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S.
37, 55 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
Note that the incipiency test does not condemn what one has done or is doing.
See Anhauser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835, 843 (7th Cir. 1961).
FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 721-26 (1948).
Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 US.
906 (1965); Maryland Baking C., 52 F.T.C. 1679 (1956), aff'd., Maryland Baking
Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1957).
= Id. See also Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 US. 115 (1954); Puerto
Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1929).
"" Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955), "W'r.
denied, 350 US. 991, rehearing denied, 351 U.S. 928 (1956); Borden Co. v. FT 339
F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1964); Dean Milk Co., [1965-67 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
17,357, at 22,543-44 (F.T.C. 1965); International Milling Co., [1965-67 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 116,494, 16,648 (F.T.C. 1963).
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discrimination' may be positively beneficial. to 'competiton. 25
The evidence in Utah Pie presented a picture of a steadily
declining price structure, and "lower prices are the hallmark
of intensified competition". 20 However, when powerful companies
use geographical price discrimination to force down consumer
prices, the apparent benefit to the public may be highly transitory.
For once local competition is forced out of business, prices may
rise again to stable ihonopoly levels, and "enhancement of prices"
is indirectly achieved through the temporary use of lower prices. 21
Whatever other values are implicit in antitrust policies, certain it
,is that one of them is limiting enhancement of prices. 28
" I In, cases like Utah Pid; although there is no conspiracy and no
threat of monopoly, the structure of the market shows few sellers
and a tendency toward price rigidity. Small local concerns, to
avoid going out of business, may well decide to cease price com-
petition -with the large: companies with their national markets
behind them, and accept their price leadership. Such conscious
parallelism2 may result in high, n6n-competitive prices.
_ It is evident, then, that consistency with the antitrust laws
does not require either a showing of monopoly or conspiracy by the
defendants or actual injury to small competitors for invocation of
section 2 (a). Nevertheless, most of the 2 (a) cases which have gone
against defendants have involved one or the other of these ele-
ments.3 0 In Utah Pie, the plaintiff appears to be a healthy com-
" Dean Milk Co., [1965-66 Transfer Binder] TRADl REG. REP,. 170339, at
22,543-44 (F.T.C. 1965)' (dissenting opinion of Elman, Comm'r.).
IUtah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 706 (1967) (dissenting
opinion). ' "
United States v. American Tobacco C., 221 U.S. 106, 181.82 (1911).
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
In antitrust jargon, this "term describes the behavior of a seller who is acutely
aware of the existence of his individual competitors and of the impact of his prlcng poll-
cies on the price structure of the entire market. Thus he may, unlike the pure competi-
tori maintain an arifically high price because he knows that to lower it would simply
cause others to do the same and thus would reduce his profit margin without increasing
his market share. See J. BAiN, INDUsRAL ORGANIZArON 266-339 (1959).
" Cases- of apparent Sherman Act violation: Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 P.2d
47 (1st Car. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965); Atlas Building Products Co. v.
Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1959), cert, denied, 363 U.S.
843 (1960); Maryland Baking Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1957); E.B. Muller
& Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944); Puerto Rican American Tobacco Co. v.
American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1929).
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pany with rapidly expanding sales (although there was some evi-
dence of declining profits); the defendants are clearly in compe-
tition with each other; and the jury found for them on the con-
spiracy charge. But the situation is ripe for oligopoly; there was a
consistently deteriorating price structure in the area which was at
least making life uncomfortable for the plaintiff, and there was
evidence that other small competitors were being squeezed out of
the market.sl There was also evidence, the court held, from which
the jury could have inferred predatory intent and below-cost pric-
ing. When such pricing is supported by territorial and product-
line diversification, it can continue to the point where the single-
line local competitor is either eliminated or persuaded to share the
market in the friendly atmosphere of price leadership and conscious
parallelism, and intent to create such a situation increases the likeli-
hood of its coming about.3 2 Thus, as the Court found, the jury was
justified in -inferring that there -was a reasonable possibility of
injury to competition.
Although oligopoly and conscious parallelism are not, without
more, within the prohibiions of the Sherman Act,33 the results
Cases of substantial injury to competitors: Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348
U.S. 115 (1954) (forced out of business); Volasco Products Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry
Roofing Co., 346 F.2d 661 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 US. 904 (1965); Ben Hur
Coal Co. v. Wells, 242 F.2d 481 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 910 (1957); Dean
Milk C, [1965-1967 Transfer "Bin er] TRADE REG. REP. 17,357 (F.T.C. 1965).
Although not discussed by the court, a history of Such pricing policies discourage
potential new entries into the market.
' See, e.g., Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 353 F.2d 47, 56 (1st Cir. 1964), where the
court quotes testimony of defendant's salesman:
My company .. told me to get the business in the Carolinas .... If we didn't
get it at the price I had to offer... if we lost it the company that did get it
wouldn't make any profit on it.
Of this testimony, Woodbury, CJ., says:
This indicates not healthy business competition which the statute and the anti-
trust laws are designed to foster, but price war to the death with victory not to
the most skillful and efficient competitor but to the one with the longest purse
which the Clayton Act as amended was specifically designed to prevent.
No matter what their lawyers tell them, companies often find it impossible to keep
their executives from expressing their desire that their competition would disappear and
their intent to work toward that end. See the evidence of predatory intent in atses cited
note 31 supra, especially E.B. Muller & Co. v. FTC and Volasco Products Co. v. Lloyd
A. Fry Roofing Co. See also Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. FTC, 371 F.2d 277 (7th Cir.
1966). Mr. Fry expressed his determination to violate §2 (a) before a Senate Subcom-
mittee. STAFF OF THE SENATB SUBCOMM. ON ANTrfRUST AND M,,ONOPOLY, 85TH
CONG, 2ND SEss., ADnasn m PPar .cEs-APHALT ROoFnG (Comm. Print 1958).
1 Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541
(1954).
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may well differ only in degree from the results of monopoly and
conspiracy: rigid price structures at high profit levels. Direct prohi-
bition of oligopoly power would be difficult to administer and
would place liability on businessmen engaged only in the ordinarily
prudent conduct of their businesses.34 But when specific practices
such as price discrimination, below-cost selling, etc., can be pin.
pointed, which tend to create or foster an oligopolistic market, 86
there is no reason why the basic goals of antitrust policy should
not be furthered by attacking these practices through section 2 (a)
of the Robinson-Patman Act.
Utah Pie, as Justice Stewart points out, has an unusual aspect
which seems at first blush to negative any possible injury to com-
petition by defendants. Plaintiff is the dominant seller in the
market, beginning with a "monopolistic" 66.5 percent and continu-
ing, except for one year, to be the largest single seller, ending the
period in question with 45.3 percent when no other seller had as
much as 30 percent. However, a large market share or even a
"monopoly" share does not necessarily indicate market power. In
the Maryland Baking Co. case, Commissioner Secrest held:
The fact that the competitor couldnot maintain its relative
position in the face of price cuts by the larger company shatters
any contention that it had a monopolistic hold on the market 80
The small company had had its local market share reduced from
91.3 percent to 58.2 percent by the price raids of the national
company."r
Small local producers, at least in industries where economies
of scale are fully realized at a relatively small size, often have a
ee generally D. Turner, The Definition of Agreement under the Sherman Act:
Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REV. 655 (1962).
""[A] price reduction below cost tends to establish predatory intent", Warren,
C.J., in FTC v. Anhauser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 552 (1960). Cf. Gewin, J., In Fore-
most Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674, 679-80 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 US. 959
(1965) (secondary line case), relying on FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 50
(1948): "a showing of substantial price differences furnished a sufficient basis for in-
ferring a 'reasonable possibility' of competitive injury".
" Maryland Baking Co., 52 FTC 1679, 1689 (1956), af'd., 243 F.2d 716 (4th
Cir. 1957).
" It is true that in that case there was a substantial threat of monopoly, since Mary-
land Baking and its small competitor were the only ones selling the item in question in
the relevant market; but that fact does not seem to make the case distinguishable on this
point from the Utah Pie case, since the creation of an oligopoly can have much the same
result as the creation of a monopoly, that is, a lessening of competition and a tendency
toward stable high prices.
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natural monopoly or large market share because of the proximity
of their plants and the resulting elimination of transportation
costs. Indeed, the abstract model of perfect competition, if modi-
fied only by the addition of the element of transportation costs,
would produce a series of localized monopolies around each pro-
ducer.38 But such a monopoly carries with it only a very limited
monopoly power, restricted to the cost of transportation from the
nearest producer. If the defendants were enjoined from using any
discrimination whatsoever,3 9 even the generally legal economic
discrimination of delivered pricing 40 Utah Pie's market power
would have a ceiling at the level of the defendant's cost at their
plant plus the cost of transportation to Salt Lake City. It is mono-
poly power that results in the enhancement of prices41 and what-
ever else the values of antitrust policy deprecate. A natural mono-
poly which lacks that power need not be condemned and even, as
here, may benefit the competitive economy by providing competi-
tion on the local level for diversified corporate giants that might
otherwise have oligopoly power.
The decision in Utah Pie is consistent with the underlying
policies of our antitrust law. It has been suggested that the case
may be understandable in light of the Court's political and social
sympathy for the small independent businessman.42 Whatever part
such sympathies may have played in the decision-making process, the
result is justifiable on hardheaded economic grounds,4 based
For discussion of the problems of plant location and what economists call
"spatial differentiation', see J. CLARtK, CompETITIoN AS A DYNAmtc PRocEss 299-362
(1961); W. FELLNER, COMPETITION AMONG THE Fsw 86-91 (2d. Ed. 1965); F.
MACHLuP, THE ECONOMICS OF SLLEV'S ColMPE=TION 153-58, 234, 409-10 (1952).
It is not suggested that such a drastic remedy should be afforded, since the de-
fenses of good-faith meeting of competition and cost-justification should be left open.
15 U.S.C § 13 (a), (b) (1964).
" See note 15 supra.
" United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429-30 (2d Cir.
1945).
' Id. at 427, L. Hand, J., "It is possible, because of its indirect social or moral
effect, to prefer a system of small producers." See United States v. Von's Grocery Co.,
384 U.S. 270, 278, 288 (1966), discussed in Hale & Hale, Conantration as a
Factor in Anti-Merger Litigation, 28 OHIO ST. L. J. 599, 602-04 (1967); Quinn v.
Mobil Oil Co., 375 F.2d 273, 279-80 (Ist Cir. 1967) (dissenting opinion).
" For an epithetical opposite view, see W. Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the
Supreme Court: The Utah Pie Case, 77 YALE L. J. 70 (1967).
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solely on the value judgment that competition is a healthy and
desirable goal in our society. 44
The case is of value in providing an avenue for some control
of oligopolistic tendencies difficult to attack directly but never-
theless inimical to the goal of fostering competition. However,
it should not lead the courts to find a violation of section 2 (a)
whenever discrimination was proved. Sustained below-cost pricing,
which is supported by noncompetitive prices in other areas or
products, and predatory intent are strong indicators of present and
future tendencies toward concentration. 45 But, absent these ele-
ments, discrimination may not have oligopolistic tendencies and
may in fact be beneficial to competition. In such situations, the
factfinder and the reviewing court should be urged to make
realistic appraisals of relevant &ompetitive facts. Invocation of
mechanical word formulas cannot be made'to substitute for
adequate probative analysis. 40
Utah 'Pie should put large national sellers on notice that they
must examine their pricing policies with great care to avoid
violation of section 2 (a) .47 The burden thus placed on them is
justified by the necessity of discouraging enhancement of prices
by placing some control on the power of such sellers in oligopolis-
tic A or potentially oligopolistic markets. As Justice White says,
"Congress' has established some ground rules for the game" 48-
ground rules which should and can be used to further the overall
policies of antitrust law.
Cf. Black, J., in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213
(1959):
Monopoly can as surely thrive by the elimination of such small businessmen,
one at a time, as it can by driving them out in large groups.
Much of the same can be said for oligopoly, especially when it can be done region by
region.
,5 In merger cases, the Court has frequently held that the Clayton Act is directed
at preventing tendencies toward oligopoly. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294 (1962).
46 Goldberg, J., in FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 527 (1963). Cl. Quaker
Oats Co., [1963-65 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,135 (F.T.C. 1964) (opinion
by Elman, Comm'r.).
" The case presents the most serious problem for the national company which wishes
to enter a new market by temporary offerings at low prices. Such a company should
take care to avoid supplying plaintiffs with evidence of predatory intent, and it should
probably maintain its prices above its costs, even if that means staying out of a few
markets.
' Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 702 (1967).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE ACTION UNDER EQUAL PROTEC-
TION CLAUSE OF FOURTEENTH A ENDMENT-EYMPLOYMENT DISCRIM-
INATION ON PUBLIC WORKS PRojEcTs-Ethridge vi. Rhodes, 268 F.
Supp. 83 (S. D. Ohio 1967)-The State of Ohio can enter into pub-
lic works contracts only with contractors who will secure their labor
force from sources that will reasonably insure equal opportunities
to all qualified persons regardless of race or color. So ruled the
Federal District Court for the Southern District of Ohio in Ethridge
v. Rhodes,' a decision hailed as a landmark in the civil rights
field.2
William Ethridge and Jerome Welch brought a class action
against state officials to enjoin them from entering into contracts
for construction of a building at Ohio State University. Plaintiffs
proved that the proposed contractors for the project hired ex-
clusively from craft unions which denied membership to qualified
Negroes. The court found that state officials had knowledge of
this practice and acquiesced in it. The court concluded that the
State was therefore a joint participant in a pattern of racial dis-
crimination. The State's joint participation was held to be a vio-
laion of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to
the United States Constitution. In addition, plaintiffs' remedies
under the Federal Civil Rights Acts and the Ohio Fair Employment
Practices Statute4 Were held to be inadequate, thus justifying
equitable relief. On this basis the court enjoined the State from
entering into contracts with contractors who secure their labor
force from unions which discriminate against Negroes.
The far-reaching impact of the Ethridge decision is best
understood in light of the structure of the construction industry.
Contractors who bid on public works projects generally have
exclusive hiring hall agreements with craft unions. Craft unions
have a monopoly on the high paying, skilled labor jobs of the
industry. Negroes have often found it exceedingly difficult, if not
impossible, to gain admission into these unions.5 Plaintiffs in the
268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
" Both the national and local NAACP hailed this as a landmark decision in the
civil rights movement." Columbus Citizen-Journal, August 10, 1967, at 30, coL I.
* 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1-15 (1964).
SOHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4112.01-.99 (Page 1965).
See R. MARSHALL, THE NEGRO AND ORGANIZED LABOR (1965); L SOVERN,
LEGAL RESTRAIT ON RAcIAL DIS AIMNAON 137 (1966); A. Ross & H. HILL,
EMPLOYMENT, RAcE, AND POVERTY 481 (1967); P. NORGREN & S. HILL, ToWARD
FAIR EMPLOYMENT 47 (1964).
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Ethridge case sought to put an end to discrimination in the craft
unions by isolating such unions from jobs created by public
works projects until these unions admit qualified Negroes. The
decision established the power of a federal court to halt expendi-
ture of public funds on any project where a contractor secures
his labor force from a union which discriminates against Negroes.
This decision is important for its use of the "state action"
concept of the fourteenth amendment to attack discrimination by
unions. In order for plaintiffs to prevail under the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment, it was necessary for
them to show racial discrimination by the State of Ohio. The
fourteenth amendment prohibits discrimination by the State; it
does not prohibit discrimination by private persons or organiza-
tions.6 Plaintiffs proved that proposed contractors for the project
intended to hire exclusively from craft unions which denied
membership to qualified Negroes. The difficult problem for plain-
tiffs was to show that the State participated in the unions' dis-
crimination.
The path by which the court found state participation is
highly significant and requires close analysis of the legal back-
ground and facts of the case. The legal doctrine for the decision
was furnished by the joint participation theory expounded by
the United States Supreme Court in Burton v. Wilmington Park-
ing Authority.7 In that case state action was found where there
was discrimination by a private restaurant which was a lessee
in a publicly owned and operated building. The Court concluded
the State had placed itself in a position of interdependence with
the private restaurant and hence was a joint participant in the
challenged activity. The State's failure to use its power to prevent
discrimination in the restaurant constituted the requisite state
action. The outer limits of the Court's joint participation theory
have been the subject of debate. Some have argued that wherever
the State has power to prohibit discrimination and fails to exercise
it, there is state action.8 In other words, state inaction may be the
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
365 U.S. 715 (1961).
See A. Ross & H. HILL, supra note 5, at 492-97; Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer:
Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1962).
In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), the Supreme Court upheld a California
Supreme Court ruling that a new State constitutional provision which said that neither
the State nor any agency thereof shall deny a person the right to sell or lease his house
to whomever he chooses violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend.
(V4ol. 29
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equivalent of state action. Others have sought to confine the
Burton holding to its particular fact pattern, asserting that the
location of the restaurant in a State building might suggest to an
observer that the State was lending its power and prestige to
discriminatory practices. 9 Just as the money changers were driven
from the temple because their presence suggested that the church
endorsed their activities, so the discrimination was banned from
public buildings because its presence suggested state approval.
The facts of the Ethridge case would not support a conclusion
that the State was ostensibly approving or endorsing a practice
of discrimination. The proposed contracts for the project contained
a clause prohibiting discrimination as required by state statute.10
Except in the category of heating, ventilating, and air conditioning,
bidders on the project had submitted the required written assur-
ances'1 signed by their hiring sources stating that there would be
no discrimination. The court held, however, that these steps were
insufficient to discharge the affirmative obligation of the State to
insure that there was no discrimination on the project. The court
looked beyond appearances to the reality of the situation and
required the State to do the same.
Another meaningful factual difference between the Ethridge
and Burton cases is the lack of privity between the state and the
discriminating party in Ethridge. In Burton the lessee of the
ment. This constitutional amendment would have in effect repealed California's antidis-
crimination housing law.
Justice Douglas, concurring, seems to argue that since no person may engage in the
real estate business without a State license, the State has an affirmative duty to prevent
its licensees from discriminating.
There is no difference, as I see it, between a State authorizing a licensee to prac-
tice racial discrimination and a State, without any express authorization of that
kind nevertheless launching and countenancing the operation of a licensing
system in an environment where the whole weight of the system is on the side
of discrimination. In the latter situation the State is impliedly sanctioning what
it may not do specifically.
Id. at 385.
' The majority in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 US. 369 (1967), seemed to recognize
that the State did not have an affirmative duty to enact an antidiscrimination law in the
area of housing but that, since it had, repealing such a law by the addition to the State
constitution of a provision specifically prohibiting any law restricting the sale of zeal
estate violated the fourteenth amendment because the State appeared to sanction dis-
crimination. "The right to discriminate is now one of the basic policies of the State."
Id. at 381.
:' Onto REv. CODE ANN. § 153.59 (Page 1965).
Executive Order of June 15, 1966, as amended December 20, 1966.
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state was guilty of discrimination. In Ethridge it was not the con-
tractor but the unions from which the contractor and subcon-
tractors secured their labor which were the target of the court's
wrath. Requiring the state to force its contracting parties not to
discriminate is much less than requiring the state to force a
contractor to force its union not to discriminate. Conceivably,
tunder the Ethridge theory the State may be constitutionally
reqiired to compel its contractors to force their suppliers to
force their manufacturers not to discriminate.' 2
Apart from its broad interpretation of the state action con-
cept, the Ethridge decision is significant for its recognition of the
inadequacy of state and federal administrative remedies. In order
for the court to issue an injunction it had to find that plaintiffs'
other remedies were inadequate. The court found the remedies
provided by state and federal civil rights laws deficient in two
respects: they failed to prevent psychological damage and they
allowed too much delay before meaningful results could be reached.
The defendant argued that Ohio's Fair Employment Practices law' 8
provided a 'procedure by which plaintiffs could gain access to
craft unions and be awarded back pay differentials for the pecuniary
damages they suffered. The court recognized that the statutory
procedure might redress pecuniary damage but pointed out that
it did nothing to mend the psychological damage caused by dis-
crimination. Following the lead offered by the Supreme Court in
Brown v. Board of Education,4 the court used sociological evidence
to support its conclusion that this kind of injury is not subject to
monetary valuation. Furthermore, it noted dissatisfaction with the
case-by-case approach used by the Ohio Civil Rights Commission."8
Relying upon the testimony of the Director of the Commission,
the court concluded this approach results in too long a delay
before meaningful success can be achieved. Since the state admin-
istrative remedy must be sought before the federal relief may
11 Thus the equal protection dause of the fourteenth amendment might prohibit
unions that provide labor for manufacturers who make products that are sold to the
state government from discriminating. By this device practically all unions would be
covered by the state action concept.'
OIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4112.01-.99 (Page 1965).
14 347 U.S. 483 (1954), aff'd on rehearing, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
*' This is the commission charged with the responsibility of carrying into 'effect the
provisions of Ohio's Fair Employment Practice Law. 01110 REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4112.01-
.99 (Page 1965).
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be used,'6 the federal remedy suffers from the same defect as
the state remedy.
The future effect of Ethridge may well be determined by two
questions which the court was not required to decide. First, it
did not decide what procedures a union must follow in order
to insure equal opportunity to all qualified persons regard-
less of race or color. In Ethridge the State admitted that qualified
Negroes were denied membership in craft unions, hence the exist-
ence of discrimination was not at issue in the case. Second, the
court did not reach the question of what specific procedures the
State must follow in order to discharge its obligations under the
fourteenth amendment. It is questionable whether as a matter of
sound judicial administration either of these questions is the
kind which readily lends itself to judicial determination on a case-
by-case basis. Arguably, both would be more conveniently and
efficiently handled through the administrative processes of the
Ohio Civil Rights Commission and the Ohio Department of
Public Works.' 7 The complex nature of the discriminatory con-
duct requires flexible administrative machinery capable of broad
and continuing supervision and intensive investigation without
the expense, inconvenience, and haphazardness of court action.15
Two events immediately following the decision indicate the
State's intent to comply with the principle established by the court.
The Ohio General Assembly enacted section 158.591 of the Ohio
Revised Code which invalidates exclusive hiring hall agreements
with a union which discriminates, thus allowing contractors to
seek labor from other nondiscriminating sources. This means that
contractors can legally disregard union agreements which stand in
the way of compliance with the district court's mandate. In addi-
tion, Ohio's governor has issued an executive order which spells
out the duties imposed upon those dealing with the State.'9 The
16 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1964).
This is the agency that handles the contracting for the state on many of its public
works projects. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 123.01 (Page Supp. 1966).
" See, W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADmlNIsTRATrIV LAW 3-6 (1954); Bonfield,
State Civil Rights Statutes: Some Proposals, 49 IOWA L REV. 1067, 1117 (1964).
:' Executive Order of June 5, 1967. The general provisions of the order are that
the State will deem not responsive any bid from a contractor who fails to file with his
bid pledges and commitments that:
(1) He and his subcontractors will act effectively to insure that employees are
treated equally without regard to race or color.
(2) He and his subcontractors will use as hiring sources only those in which
access to referral facilities is open to all qualified persons without discrimination.
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responsibility of the state department administering,'the contracts
will be to see that the Governor's order is enforced. 20
I Whether the district courv will be satisfied with the efforts of
the State to 6ffect the principle established by the Ethridge decision
reinains to be seen. But the implementation of the Ethtidge, prin-
ciple should be left to the administrative processes of the appro-
pritte state agencies, so: long as they in good'faith attempt to
discharge their constitutional responsibilities. An attempt by the
'courts to determine on 'a case-by-case basis the specific procedures
which must be f6llowed by hiring sources and state officials, might
vdry well tie up public construction in Ohio for years. Construc-
tion delays would'not only increase the backlog of needed public
facilities but would also have a detrimental effect on those em-
ployed on public construdtio'n projects. 21
INCOME TAX-INiRCOMPANY PRICING POLICIES' SUBJEGr TO Scd-
TION 482 -'ADJUSTMENT IF NOT IN AccoRD wiTH ARM'S LENGTH
STANDkRDs-Eli Lilly' & Co. "v. U.S., 372 F.2d 990 (Ct. Cl. 1967)-
Eli Iilly & Company, a United States corporation which manu-
factures and sells biological and ethical drugs, sued to recover
taxes. paid as a'result of an income adjustment imposed upon it
and its subsidiaries under section 482 of the, Internal Revenue
Code" as a result of the Commissioner's determination that the
corporate group's pricing policy did not conform to the prices that
would prevail among unrelated buyers and sellers. Eli Lilly's
policy was to sell its products directly to unrelated wholdsalers
(3) He and his subcontractors, where appropriate, will avail themselves of Sec-
tion 153.591, Ohio Revised Code, and hire outside the discrimination union.
(4)' He and his subcontractors will accept compliance reviews and furnish all
information requested.
If a breach of these pledges and commitments is found the contract will be sus-
pended for a period of time during which the contractor may cure his breach. Failure
to do so results in cancellation of the contract.
' Id. A third event might be indicative of the State's intention to follow the court's
decision: the state did not appeal.
' As might be assumed, a suit was filed after the decision in Ethidgg (which per-
tained only to one building project) to enjoin all public works projects within the jurls-
diction of the court, the Southern District of Ohio. Welch v. Rhodes, Civil No. 67-249
(S.D. Ohio, filed Aug. 14, 1967). This could involve approximately $300 million In
such projects.
1 INT. REv. CoDa oF 1954, § 482.
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in the 'United States and to route all foreign sales, through a
domesti6 subsidiary, International, to which Eli Lilly sold its pro-
ducts ata price equivalent to its cost, ,including allocated expenses.
But all products headed for, foreign markets within the Western
Hemisphere wee sold by International, on terms similar to the Eli
Lilly-International transactions, to Pan-American, an Eli Lilly-
owned sales subsidiary, qualifying for preferential tax treatment as
a Western Hemisphere trade corporation under Internal Revenue
Code sections 921-22. Pan-American resold these products at
prices similar to those Eli Lilly charged unrelated domestic whole-
sklers. The effect -was to leave ninety percent of the aggregate
profit of the combined Lilly organization from Western Hemis-
phere sales in Pan-American's hands. Eli Lilly argued, and it was
found by the Court of Claims, that valid business reasons existed
for such a pricing policy.
The Commissioner saw his task to be the ascertainment of
arm's length prices between Eli Lilly and its subsidiaries and
adopted as a measuring stick of such prices Eli Lilly's profit ex-
perience on its sales to uncontrolled domestic wholesalers. Assum-
ing that domestic dollars expended earned the same profit as
foreign dollars expended, the percentage figure Eli Lilly's net
income from domestic sales bore to its expenses on those sales was
computed to determine an appropriate markup on products bound
for foreign markets. Increasing the price charged International by
this percentage would increase International's cost of goods sold to
Pan-American, thereby reducing Pan-American's profits. The Com-
missioner accepted Eli Lilly's demand that he cut this percentage
in half as applied to International in recognition of the fact that
International was a quantity purchaser entitled to a discount in
price.
The Court of Claims held that Western Hemisphere trade
corporations come within the applicable scope of section 482 even
when that application operates to deprive such a corporation of
benefits conferred upon it by sections 921-22 and that the applic-
ability of section 482 is not vitiated by the existence of a valid
business purpose for an intercompany pricing policy. The court
also found that when intercompany pricing is in issue under
section 482 the proper test to apply in computing an income ad-
justment, as in determining its necessity, is to be an arm's length
standard, and if any other standards are sought to be utilized
1968]
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they must be defined within such a framework. Finally, the court
made the broad assertion that a taxpayer, to show an adjustment
is not proper, must prove both the method used by the Commis-
sioner and the end results of it are unreasonable, arbitrary, or
capricious." This opinion represents the first judicial acceptance
of the applicability of section 482 to Western Hemisphere trade
corporations, a position which had been taken by the Internal
Revenue Service since 1953. 4
But at least one commentator had taken the opposite view-
point.5 His reasoning essentially was that Congress' intention
in enacting sections 921-22 of the Code had been to confer specific
benefits upon corporations qualifying thereunder as Western
Hemisphere trade corporations, which intentions of Congress were
not to be defeated by an all-encompassing application of another
section of the Code. The Court of Claims, however, reasoned that
since these provisions were enacted subsequent to section 482 and
since Congress was certainly cognizant of the broad scope of that
section, if Congress had intended to exempt these corporations from
section 482's wide sweep it could have so provided. Although unable
to find cases directly in point, the court in its discussion alluded
to National Securities Corp. v. Commissioner,° where it was held
that the antecedent of section 4827
is directed to the correction of particular situations in which
the strict application of the other provisions of [the Code] will
result in a distortion of the income of affiliated organizations.8
Although that court was concerned with the benefits conferred
under the then sections 112 (b) (5) and 113 (a) (8) ,1 the reasoning
is also applicable and persuasive when sections 921-22 are subjects
of dispute.
Eli Lilly is also the latest in a growing number of decisions to permit the Com-
missioner to reallocate net income of controlled taxpayers. See Hamburger York Road,
Inc., 41 T.C. 821 (1964), acquiesced in, 1965-2 CuM. BULL. 5, appeal dismissed Per
stipulation, 4th Cir. (Nov. 9, 1964); Ballentine Motor Co., 39 T.C. 348 (1962), a/'d,
321 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1963).
* Rev. Rul. 15, 1953-1 CUM. BULL. 141.
* Baker & Sarabia, The Function of Tax Incentives in International Trade, 26 TUL,
L REv. 405, 423-24 (1952).
137 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 794 (1943).
'INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 45.
137 F.2d 600, 602 (3d Cir. 1943).
" INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, ch. 1, §§ 112(b) (5), 113(a) (8), 53 STA. 37, 42
(now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 351, 362).
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That* section 482 is properly utilized in such instances seems
a justifiable result when it is considered that Congress, in enacting
sections 921-22, must have been concerned with increasing exports
to our American neighbors. In sanctioning lower tax rates for such
sales it cannot be supposed that Congress meant to permit markups
on costs that bore no relationship at all to the price a seller would
demand of another uncontrolled taxpayer. Rather, Congress' inten-
tion would seem to be directed toward reducing taxes on the normal
profits of such a corporation, not toward allowing abnormal profits
to be accumulated by it and taxed at this lower rate.
The court's holding that valid business reasons for an inter-
company pricing policy is not sufficient to prevent a realocation
under section 482 was a recognition that this section serves not
only to prevent tax avoidance but also to effectuate a true re-
flection of income as between two related entities.10 Although a
finding of a valid business purpose would seem to negate a tax
avoidance motive as a reason for an adjustment, the income-shifting
within the Lilly organization resulted in a failure clearly to reflect
income and hence warranted a reallocation. The court in so hold-
ing relied upon two cases" which upheld the power of the Com-
missioner to reallocate under section 482 where an undue tax
advantage results, regardless of the existence or not of valid bus-
iness purposes for shifting income. This has been the trend of the
cases.
1 2
The most significant aspects of the Eli Lilly decision concern
the problems of what standards are to be applied in determining
inter-company prices between related entities, and the burden
of proof incumbent upon the taxpayer in resisting a reallocation
under section 482. Present Treasury Regulations call for an arm's
length standard' 3 but have not set forth any guidelines as to how
to set prices in accordance with it. The best the present regulations
do is to imply that it is the amount of income each related
organization would have realized if it had not been affiliated with
20 INT. Ri.m CODE OF 1954, § 482. The Report of the Ways and Means Committee
on the Revenue Act of 1928 describes the evils which § 482 was designed to core
HR. REP. No. 2, 70TH CONG., lsT SESS. 16 (1927); S. REP. No. 960, 70TH CONG,
1sT Snss. 24 (1928).
"1 Central Cuba Sugar Co. v. Comm'r., 198 .2d 214 (2d Cir. 1952). ert, denied,
344 U.S. 874 (1952); Dillard-Waltermire, Inc. v. Campbell, 255 B.2d 433 (Sth Cir.
1958).
See Brilof, The Matt, Mad, Mad, Mad World of Section 482, 124 J. AcouNT-
ANCY 44, 49 (Aug. 1967).
' Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b) (1) (1962).
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the other entities involved in the transactions. 14 A partial clarifi-
cation of this problem was given by Revenue Procedure 63-10,1r
which suggested that prices realized from sales of identical or
similar products to unrelated purchasers, adjusted for differences
in circumstances, were to be utilized in determining a proper
arm's length price. In addition, a number of cases had held or
recognized implicitly that arm's length is the proper standard, 16
but in these cases information was available to determine what
would be a comparable price between unrelated purchasers such as
was contemplated by, Revenue Procedure 63-10. Other courts,
however, without such information available reached a determina-
tion of a proper reallocation without referring to the arm's length
testy17
In one of these latter cases the Ninth Circuit reviewed the
pricing policy between a United States parent corporation and its
wholly-owned Western Hemisphere trade corporation and con-
cluded that the "fair and reasonable" standard was a proper one
to apply. The court stated that arm's length bargaining is not the
sole criterion for determining what is the true net income of each
controlled taxpayer."' This position was consistent with Polak's
Frutal Works, 1nc.1 9 which decided that a parent company receiv-
ing from its affiliates what would be considered in its industry
as fair and reasonable prices is not subject to a reallocation. These
decisions suggest that the arm's length test can be ignored where
adequate objective guidelines are not provided. Thus the Court
of Claims, in deciding Eli Lilly, had two lines of cases bearing on
its decision: (1) where comparable price information is available
qand must be used to determine prices by an arm's length standard
and (2) where no comparable prices are available.
It is submitted, however, that the court did not have a choice
between two distinct lines of decisions, for a closer inspection of
Polak's and the cages followed by the Ninth Circuit in Frank
* "-See Armstrong, Current Problems under Section 482, 43 TAXES 70 (1965).
15 1963-1 Cum BuLL. 490. ,
' Esrenco Track Co., P-H TAX. Cr. MEm. 63, 072 (1963); Seminole Rock &
Sand Co., 19 T.C. 259 (1952); Seminole Flavor Co., 4 T.C. 1215 (1945).
1 Frank v. International Canadian Corp., 308 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1962); Fried-
lander Corp., 25 T.C. 70 (1955); Grenada Industries, Inc., 17 T.C. 231 (1951), aJ'd.,
202 F 2d 873 (5th Ctr. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 819 (1953). These latter cases
were cited in the Frank opinion as support for its major holding.
308 F.2d 520, 528 (9th Cir. 1962).
21 T.C. 953, 976 (1954).
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reveal that they were not significant departures from the arm's
length criterion. The courts in these cases, including Frank, were
faced with the need of establishing a price in vacuo. Confronted
with this difficulty, these courts appeared to be using "fair and
reasonable" and similar terms as largely synonymous with "arm's
length" rather than as terms having substantially different mean-
ings.20 Such terms seem to have been used in these cases to connote
that a corporation should determine selling prices to its controlled
companies so that it realizes a reasonable profit on its own contri-
bution of capital and services. This would constitute an objective
means of determining what price would have been charged to
uncontrolled entities.21 The Frank decision, although it cannot be
explained upon such a rationale, was later dismissed by the Ninth
Circuit as only a slight departure from an arm's length standard.22
That court went on to say that "it is not unreasonable to construe
true taxable income as that which would have resulted... from
arm's length dealings between unrelated entities."23
In light of such an interpretation and the fact that Frank
was airily dismissed in a later decision, the Eli Lilly decision seemed
not to be so much a return to arm's length standards as a re-
affirmation of them. The accuracy of this observation was em-
phasized by the court's statement that
fair and reasonable... must be [decided] within the framework
of 'reasonable or fair' as among unrelated taxpayers .... Even if
the arm's length standard is not the sole criterion, it is certainly
the most significant yardstick.2 4
The court's test is consistent with the Proposed Treasury
Regulations. These regulations set out methods by which revenue
agents and taxpayers can ascertain arm's length prices for their
intercompany sales and often mention the acceptability of reason-
able alternatives to those enumerated, as did the cases cited in
Frank.2 5 However, the unmistakable import of the proposed regula-
tions leaves no doubt that these terms are to be conceptualized
within an arm's length framework. Thus, as in Eli Lilly, the phrase
- Rev. Proc. 63-10, 1963-1 CUM. BULL 490.
" Brief for the US. at 33, Eli Lilly v. U.S, 372 1.2d 990 (Ct CL 1967). See afto
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(e) (3)-(4), 31 Fed. Reg. 10394 (1966).
" Oil Base Co. v. Commissioner, 362 F.2d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1966).
' Id. at 214.
" 372 .2cd 990, 1000 (Ct CL 1967).
1 See Pergament, New 482 Regs Provide Arm's Length Rules, Flexibility in Pricing
of Tangible Property, 25 J. TAXATION 238 (1966).
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fair and reasonable means the prices that would be satisfactory to
unrelated sellers and buyers, not the prices that operate "as a
business incentive in transactions among controlled corporations.1
20
Although the C6urt of Claims seemed to characterize the
method used by the Revenue agent as arbitrary,27 this criticism
would be unwarranted under the proposed regulations. By comput-
ing Eli Lilly's profit experience on unaffiliated sales in relation
to its costs and applying this profit percentage to Eli Lilly's sales
to International, the Commissioner conformed in the major par-
ticulars to the cost plus method of the proposed regulations. 28 It is
unlikely, however, that the Court of Claims disapproves of this
method recommended in the proposed regulations. That the court
seemed to term the Revenue agent's method arbitrary appears more
the result of loose language than any failure by the court to recog-
nize that any arbitrariness in what was done came as a result of
making adjustments upon his basic methodology. If the Eli Lilly
situation were presented under the proposed regulations, the court
would probably recognize this fact.
A Revenue agent would be likely to apply the same basic
methodology if he were to make this allocation under the pro-
posed regulations, since neither the comparable uncontrolled price"0
method nor the resale price"0 method is appropriate to the Eli
Lilly situation. Still there would be a problem as to the volume
discounts, the arbitrary factor, conceded to International by the
agent, for the proposed regulations do not provide for them as an
item to be considered in adjusting prices. But there is hope ex-
pressed that the new regulations will be flexible enough to handle
such multivaried situations.31
The other significant aspect of the Eli Lilly decision is the
.court's sweeping holding that the taxpayer bears the burden of
showing not only that the Service's determination of adjustments
2' 372 F.2d 990, 1000 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
" The Court of Claim said "Eli Lilly justifiably complained of such subjectivity."
372 F.2d 990, 997 (Ct. CL 1967). It also implied that it considered the method as
arbitrary by quoting from Leedy-Glover Realty & Insurance Co., 13 T.C. 95, 107 (1949),
that "although themethod of allocation used ... might appear to be arbitrary ... ." Id.
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(e) (4), 31 Fed. Reg. 10394 (1966), But see
Seghers, Eli Lilly Case Points to a Defense Against IRS Intercompany Pticing Suits, 92
BUs. ABROAD 21, 24 (May 15, 1967).
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1A82-2 (e) (2), 31 Fed. Reg. 10394 (1966).
Id. at § 1.482-2 (e) (3). But see Rothkopf, Sectiot; 482 in Perspecive-A Re.
view of the PFroposed Regulations, 44 TAXES 727, 733 (1966).
" Pergament, stupra note 25.
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was arbitrarily arrived at, i.e., that it does not fit the arm's length
yardstick, but also that the result, however determined, was unrea-
sonable, arbitrary, or capricious. This decision makes the legality
of reallocations under section 482 depend primarily upon the end
results of an adjustment by the Service and only secondarily upon
the methodology employed to arrive at the result.
The first observation of this holding as to burden of proof is
that it seems to go much farther than the facts required. There
was strong justification for the basic premises used by the Revenue
agent. The only subjective aspect of his method was made as a con-
cession to Eli Lilly's demands. As noted previously, such a method
as here used is not arbitrary in its basic application; the court
could have limited itself to holding that Eli Lilly failed in meeting
this burden.3 2 The principle enunciated by the Court of Claims
could be read to free the Service entirely from the burden of con-
structing the rationale for its adjustments under section 482.
Such a situation conflicts with the proposed regulations. The
court in its discussion of taxpayer's burden of proof quotes an
earlier case in which it was said "Our concern is more with the
ultimate results arrived at by the Commissioner than the methods
which he uses."33 In view of the proposed regulations, which put
an emphasis upon prescribing correct methods of reallocations,3 4
one can wonder about the value of such a statement. The proposed
regulations are supposedly guidelines for both the taxpayer and
Revenue agents. But by the Court of Claims' holding, the agent
need only get a reasonable end result; he will no longer need to
worry about methodology. His only guide in making reallocations
will be hindsight. The taxpayer, however, must as well have an
awareness of the end result by other means of computation than
that which he utilizes and remain within the constraints so de-
termined to avoid a reallocation on the ground that his result
is unreasonable.
One commentator points out that this holding, when con-
sidered in conjunction with the broad discretion given the Com-
missioner to reallocate under section 482, could give rise to im-
Tillinghast, The Appllc.ation of Section 482 to International Operefionst Inter.
Company Pricing Problems, N.Y.U. 24T- INST. ON FED. TAX., 1433, 1453-54 (1967).
Tillinghast suggests that these facts would seem to require a limited estoppel kind of
argument by the government rather than the result reached.
Leedy-Glover Realty & Insurance Co., 13 T.C. 95, 107 (1949).
Pergament, supra note 25.
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possible situations for a taxpayer. 85 Hypothetically, suppose a tax.
payer sets intercompany prices at a reasonable level although
arrived at arbitrarily. Presumably the Commissioner can still effect
an adjustment, however done, so long as his determination also
falls within the range of reasonable prices that can arise from the
facts, since section 482 is a discretionary section and the taxpayer
can attack the result only if it is unreasonable. Under the Court
of Claims holding in, Eli Lilly, the taxpayer will get no protection.
There is a factor present, however, which may alleviate the disrup-
tion to taxpayers: planning operations in that the proposed regula.
tions imply that the taxpayer should be able to show the unreason-
ableness of the Commissioner's determination merely by demon-
strating that what the taxpayer has done was reasonable itself.80
These regulations should be a boon to tax planning by corpora-
tions in the area of intercompany pricing. They serve to limit the
Commissioner's discretion in making adjustments by narrowing
the permissible methods he may use to reallocate and thus reduce
the taxpayers' difficulty of showing such discretion was abused. The
proposed regulations also give the corporate planners guidelines
to follow in establishing attack-free pricing policies. In the latter
respect, the Eli Lilly decision will not detract from these regula-
tions, but as to the burden of proof upon a taxpayer, the proposed
regulations emphasize component aspects of this issue that Eli
Lilly deemphasizes. Hopefully, the proposed regulations will afford
the courts an opportunity in later cases to reconsider the hold-
ing of Eli Lilly.
LABOR LAW-CouRT ENFORCEMENT OF UNION FINES UNDER THE
TAFT-HARTLEY Acrr-NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
175 (1967) -In 1959 and 1962 Local 248, in West Allis, Wisconsin,
and Local 401, in LaCrosse, Wisconsin, both locals of the United
Auto Workers held lawful economic strikes against Allis-Chalmers.
At both strikes, members of each local crossed picket lines and
worked.1 Local 248 sent letters to its members threatening possible
Haderlein, Problems of Proof in a Section 482 Case, PROcEEDINGS OF INST, ON
U.S. TAXATzON OF FoRmIGN INCOME, INC. 106, 121-23 (Sept. 9-11, 1965).
' See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2 (e) (1) (iii), 31 Fed. Reg. 10394 (1966);
Haderlein, supra note 35.
' In 1959, 175 members of Local 248 and 2 members of Local 401 worked; In
1962, 30 members of Local 248 and 4 members of Local 401 worked, Brief for Appellant
at 4, NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
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fines during the 1959 strike but was unsuccessful in deterring some
of its members from working. After the strikes, each local instituted
union trial proceedings against those members who crossed picket
lines and fined them individually a total amount not in excess
of 100 dollars. To enforce the penalties Local 248 brought suit
in the Milwaukee County Court against one of the strike breaking
members and received a judgment in its favor.2 In charges by
Allis-Chalmers, the National Labor Relations Board dismissed an
unfair labor practice complaint under section 8 (b) (1) (A).3 The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the decision. Upon
rehearing, the Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, reversed and
remanded. 4 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari5
and held that in this situation a union could threaten to fine
"full" members,6 could fine them, and could enforce those fines
through state court proceedings without committing an unfair
labor practice under section 8 of the Taft-Hartley Act.7
The crux of the case is the Court's interpretation of sections
7 and 8 (b) (1) (A).8 Section 8 (b) (1) (A) makes it an unfair
labor practice for a union to "restrain or coerce" employees in the
exercise of their section 7 rights, which include the right to refrain
from concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining.
The difficulty lies in the definition of the phrase "restrain or
coerce." The majority found the words inherently impreciseP and
proceeded to probe our national labor policy and legislative history
to determine their effect upon union activity.
Basically, unions have only three legitimate means of disci-
pline-expulsion, suspension, and fines. 10 The Court began with
the fact that unions had traditionally used fines as a disciplinary
tool prior to the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act 1' Prior to
the Taft-Hartley Act, state courts had decided cases involving union
imposition of disciplinary fines and had recognized the union's right,
' Local 248, UAW v. Natzke, No. 313-673 (Milwaukee Comunty Cir. C., Mardi 3,
1967).
' Local 248, UAW (Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.), 149 N.LR.B. 67 (1964).
' Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1966).
' NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 385 U.S. 810 (1966).
' See note 31 infra.
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
s 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (b) (1) (A) (1964).
' NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 179 (1967).
" Summers, Discplnary Procedures of Unions, 4 IND. & LAB. RE.. REv. 15, 26
(1950).
U Id.
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as a voluntary association, to fine its members.1 2 The question has
arisen most frequently where an employer sues to obtain an injunc-
tion of union use of fines'3 or where a union member sues to
enjoin the enforcement of a fine by expulsion.1 4 However, a
union's right to enforce fines in court has also been recognized. 15
The theoretical basis for judicial involvement in union dis-
cipline has been common law doctrines pertaining to voluntary
associations.1" The courts have most often combined property and
contract theories to find a power to review union discipline. 17 The
contract theory, which the Court in Allis-Chalmers expressly recog-
nizes, provides a standard of judicial review under which a union's
power to discipline is gauged by its constitution and by-laws. Thus
courts review disciplinary actions by using the union's own yard-
stick. But they temper this by insuring that union discipline offends
22 Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N.Y. 342, 358-59, 117 N.W. 582, 585 (1917); jetton.
Dekle Lumber Co. v. Mather, 53 Fla. 969, 975, 43 So. 590, 592 (1907).
"See, e.g., Barker Painting Co. v. Bhd. of Painters, 23 F.2d 743 (D.C Cir. 1927),
cert. denied, 276 U.. 631 (1928); Rhodes Bros. v. Musicians Union, 37 R.I 281, 92
A. 641 (1915); Jetton-Dekle Lumber Co. v. Mather, 53 Fla. 969, 43 So. 590 (1907),
" See, e.g., McGinley v. Milk Salesmen Local 205, 351 Pa. 47, 40 A.2d 16 (1945);
Smith v. Printing Pressmen's Union, 190 S.W. 2d 769 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945), rav'd on
other grounds, 198 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946); Angrisani v. Steam, 167 MIsc.
731, 3 N.Y.S.2d 701 (Spec. Sess.), aff'd., 225 App. Div. 975, 8 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1938).
Cf. Clark v. Morgan, 271 Mass. 164, 171 N.E. 278 (1930).
Local 756, UAW v. Woychick, 5 Wis. 2d 528, 93 N.W.2d 336 (1958). This
case contains a fact pattern almost identical to the principal case. The court did not
consider § 8(b) (1) (A). Cf. Div. 1478 of Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v,
Ross, 90 N.J. Super 391, 217 A.2d 883 (1966).
See also Comment, Judicial Enforcement of Union Disciplinary Finey, 76 YALIU
IU. 563, n. 4 (1967), which suggests that cases of court-enforced union fines are rare
for two reasons: (1) the cost of bringing suit was generally greater than the fine; (2) a
member could usually resign from the union before engaging in conduct which would
incur a fine.
26 Int'l. Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers v. Couch, 236 Ala. 611, 184 So. 173 (1938);
Bush v. Int'l. Alliance of Theater Operators, 55 Cal. App. 2d 357, 130 P.2d 788 (1942);
Attig v. Teamsters Local 90, 231 Iowa 1, 300 N.W. 636 (1941). But see Mitchell v,
InreL Ass'n. of Machinists, 196 Cal. App. 2d 796, 16 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1961), which
recognized unions as primarily legislative creatures and therefore quite different from
"social clubs".
Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1054
(1951).
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neither public policy nor due process.18 Thus a theoretical basis for
court enforcement of union fines can be found in common law
principles. Nevertheless, this does not preclude objections to en-
forcement based on the Taft-Hartley Act.
Support for the proposition that Taft-Hartley leaves the union's
right to court-enforcement of fines intact can be found in the
Act itself. Section 13 of the Taft-Hartley Act reads:
Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for
herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or im-
pede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the
limitations or qualifications on that right.') (Emphasis added.)
Assuming, as the Court did, that the right to enforce a fine cm be
essential to the weak union's ability to strike,20 section 13 suggests
that section 8 (b) (1) (A) was not meant to prohibit court-enforce-
ment of fines since they were not specifically outlawed. Of course,
Congress cannot be held to have foreseen every question that might
arise under the Act. But the facts that the fine was a traditional
means of union discipline and that the right to enforce it in court
has adequate precedent further indicate that if Congress had
intended to remove that disciplinary tool it would have expressly
said so.21 Still the question revolves around the central dispute:
Do the simple words "restrain or coerce" preclude court enforce-
ment of fines?
The majority quoted many statements made during Senate
debate of the Taft-Hartley Act which suggests that section 8 (b)
-(I) (A) with its prohibition on restraint and coercion was meant
to apply only to union organizational drives, mass picketing, or
the violence that has sometimes accompanied labor disputes, not
to govern traditional internal union affairs. From this, the court
implied that Congress did not intend a court-enforced fine to
Cox finds five grounds that courts have used to overrule a union's disciplinary
action: (1) the procedure violates the "union-member contract," (2) the "contract" does
not authorize the reprisal taken for the specific offense, (3) the procedure does not
provide for a fair hearing, (4) the action was either against public policy, unreasonable,
or contrary to the principles of lstice, or (5) the action was in bad faith. He goes on
to suggest that he believes satisfactory rules have been developed. Cox, Internal Affairs
of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 MicH. L. REV. 819, 835-36
(1960).
29 U.S.C. § 163 (1964).
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg Co., 388 US. 175, 183-84 (1967).
See NIRB v. Drivers Local 639, 362 U.S. 274 (1960), which applied this reason-
ing to the question of whether recognition of picketing by a minority union was an unfair
labor practice.
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fall within the scope of the term coercion. Justice Black, dissent-
ing, considered court enforcement of fines clearly coercive. He
bulwarked this position by questioning the strength of the support
for the majority view of the traditional nature of a court-enforced
fine. He also differed from the majority's view of legislative history
in that he placed emphasis on several statements made during the
debates referred to by the majority that section 8 (b) (1) (A) was
intended to place the same restrictions upon the union as upon the
employer, thus imposing limits on internal union activities.22
The majority's interpretation, however, is in line with several
cases in which the court has accorded section 8 (b) (1) (A) similar
treatment.23 Upon this basis the Court found that union members
are not subjected to coercion or restraint by the "traditional union
discipline" of 'fining, The Court also concluded that allowing
court enforcement of fines is in harmony with present national
labor, policy. It reasoned that if the union had not been able to
enforce its fines in court it would have retained only expulsion as
the most effective weapon for enforcement. Then an insubordinate
member would have risked nothing more than loss of membership
in the union by failing to pay his fine. Expulsion would even be
financially beneficial in that it would remove his duty to pay union
dues without endangering his employment.2 4 The result for unions
with weak member allegiance would be to undermine the strike
as an effective economic weapon. The Court deemed this to be an
unhappy prospect because "the economic strike against the em-
ployer is the ultimate weapon in labor's arsenal for achieving
agreement upon its terms .... ,,5 The loss of this weapon would
seriously undercut the position of a weak union in collective bar-
" The'use of legislative history is rather unsatisfactory because § 8(b) (1) (A) was
introduced as an amendment by Senator Ball, and debate was limited in amount. See 93
CoNG. REC. 4270 (1947), II LEG. HIST. OF THE LMRA 1138 (1948). The quotations
used by the majority and by the dissent seem to boil down to Senator Ball versus Senator
Taft, both supporters of the amendment. Ball emphasized that § 8 (b) (1) (A) was not
intended to affect internal union affairs, whereas Taft suggested a parallel restriction
upon unions as was imposed upon employers.
' Local 100, Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 696-97 (1963): NLIRB V.
Drivers Local 639, 362 U.S. 274, 290 (1960); Int'l. Ass'n. of Machinists v. Gonzales,
356 U.S. 617, 620 (1958). See American Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 782, 800
(7th Cir. 1951), aff'd., 345 U.S. 100 (1953).
' Sections 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2) make it dear that a man's employment is pro-
tected against all but failure to pay union initiation fees or dues. 29 U.S.C. § 158'(a) (3)
(1964) and 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (2) (1964).
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 181 (1967).
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gaining, which in turn would obstruct the declared purpose of
the Taft-Hartley Act-promoting labor peace "by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining."26
But the Court was hesitant to rule that national labor policy
requires that all union members be exposed to court-enforced fines.
The Allis-Chalmers case was concerned with members who had
actively participated in union affairs. The question of whether
unions can enforce fines against dues-paying members who have
joined only because of a union security clause and are not active
in union affairs is specifically reserved for later judgment.
Under sections 8 (a) (3) and 8 (b) (2)27 union security clauses
inserted in contracts are clearly fair labor practices. Radio Officers
Union v. NLRB28 held that
Congress intended to prevent utilization of union security agree-
ments for any other purposes than to compel payment of union
dues and fees. Thus Congress recognized the validity of unions'
concern about 'free riders' . .. .29
An employee in a union shop must become a member to the ex-
tent of paying his dues, but no further. In fact, a member, as the
term is used in section 8 (a) (3), need not even be an actual mem-
ber of the union where an agency shop is in effect.30
When considering the effect of a union security clause, the
Court in Allis-Chalmers admitted there is a distinction between
what it calls "full" members,31 who participate in union activi-
ties and are subject to union fines, and inactive members, who
only pay dues and may or may not be subjected to union fines.
The inactive member is somewhere between a "full" member and
a nonmember. Under the Taft-Hartley Act a fine against a non-
member would be an unfair labor practice because it would affect
his decision to exercise his section 7 right to participate or not in
protected concerted activities and would not be sheltered as an
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) and 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1964).
= 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
Id. at 41. See Union Starch & Refining Co. v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 1008, 1012 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951).
' NI.RB v. General Motors Corp., 373 US. 734 (1963), held that an agency shop
agreement, where an employee need not join the union but has to pay dues, did not
violate §§ 8 (a) (3) and 8(b) (2).
' The criteria to determine "full" membership are not dear. The Court refers to
a pledge of allegiance, an oath, participation in strike proceedings, and voting. This is
a matter which must be clarified if the distinction is to be continued meaningfully.
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internal union affair.32 At common law he would be protected
because he had not voluntarily submitted himself to the union
constitution and by-laws. The same arguments seem to apply to
the inactive member. If the purpose of Congress in sections 8 (a) (3)
and 8 (b) (2) was to protect employee job rights while enhancing
the union treasury it seems highly unlikely that Congress intended
to submit inactive members to union discipline by making them
a legitimate subject for "internal union affairs." The common
law basis for court enforcement is removed. Fines against in-
active members are no longer a "traditional" means of discipline
because the inactive member is a new creature; he cannot be
said to have subjected himself to union discipline on the basis
of a consensual contract or voluntary association theory. There-
fore, it seems probable that the Court would find an attempt at
court enforcement of a union fine on second class members an
unfair labor practice.33
If this accurately foretells the outcome of future litigation and
if unions choose to assert their newly assured power to enforce
fines, the prospective union shop employee will be faced with two
alternatives: one, to become active as a "full" member and sub-
mit himself to possible financial liability for the breach of a union
rule; two, to become a member only to the extent of paying his
dues, foregoing any form of participation or any liability for
fines and yet receiving the same benefits of fair representation. It
seems questionable whether the appeal of active participation is
strong enough to make this a meaningful choice. Perhaps Pyrrhus
reigns today in union circles. On the other hand, unions may follow
the better course of discretion in fining members.
' Following Local 100, Journeymen v. Borden, 373 US. 690 (1963) and San
Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), this would probably mean that the state
courts no longer have jurisdiction to consider this type of case, for it is arguably subject
to the protection of §§ 7 and 8 and thus within the NLRB's jurisdiction.
If the Court in Allis-Chalmers had decided that union use of fines against any type
of member was an unfair labor practice, state court jurisdiction to review union fines
may well have been removed by the federal preemption doctrine, This would have been
a significant change.
' This would, once again, raise a significant federal preemption question. See
note 32 supra.
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